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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Puipose of Article
This article examines some of the American literature on the
interpretation of constitutionally guaranteed rights, and considers the
application of the ideas to the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.' The conclusions are enumerated at the end of the
article. I fear that they may appear rather banal to those who have
not been following the American literature on rights. The reader
may wish to consult the conclusions before deciding finally to
embark on the journey through the intervening text.
B. Legitimacy of Judicial Review
The problem of the legitimacy of judicial review is
inescapably central to the discussion. It should be noticed at the
outset, however, that it is a much less serious problem in Canada
than it is in the United States. First of all, Canada adopted the
Charter in full knowledge that the application of the Charter by
non-elected, non-accountable judges would nullify the acts of elected
legislative bodies and accountable officials, and would occasionally do
so in unpredictable ways; this issue was a major theme of the
political debate that preceded the adoption of the Charter.
Secondly, the override clause of section 33, which was inserted to
placate the provinces who feared the power of judicial review,
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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enables judicial decisions under most of the provisions of the Charter
to be overridden by the competent legislative body.
For these two reasons, a judicial decision striking down a law
or act for breach of the Charter does not seriously disturb basic
democratic principles, and Canadians need not agonize over the
issue of legitimacy in the way that the Americans have done.
2
These points are more fully explored later in the article.
C. Natural Rights
I should make clear an underlying assumption of the article
that will render some of the discussion unsatisfying to some readers.
I do not believe in "natural rights." If that makes me a positivist, so
be it. I do not know how to identify natural rights, from whence
they derive their authority, or what the legal effect of their breach
could be.3 I do not trust any judge to reach conclusions on these
matters. My scepticism is reinforced by the widely differing accounts
of rights that are given by legal philosophers such as Dworkin,
4
Rawls,5 Nozick,6 and Finnis,7 who do believe in natural rights.8 To
me, rights are creatures of law. The rights guaranteed by the
2 Any decision by a non-elected judge that has political consequences (which occur in
other fields as well as constitutional law) raises an issue of legitimacy.
3An excellent critique of natural rights theories isJ.A. Griffith, Public Rights and Provided
hnerests (Trivandrum: Academy of Legal Publications, 1981) at 5-19.
4 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978).
-J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).
6R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Black-well, 1975).
7J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
SAll I mean by "natural rights" are rights derived from sources other than positive law.
The viewpoints of Dworkin, Rawls, and Nozick and others (but not Finnis) are conveniently
collected in a set of essays: D. Lyons, ed., Rights (California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1979).
For a brief secondary account, see J.W. Harris, Legal Philosophies (London: Butterworths,
1980).
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Charter of Rights are legally enforceable because they are contained
in a supreme constitutional instrument, not because they reflect the
natural rights of man (or woman).
The rights guaranteed in the Charter are worthy of respect
as sound moral ideals, but many other ideals that are also morally
sound are not enshrined in the Charter. One of the dangers of the
Charter is that it elevates its precepts over others that, in my view,
are just as worthy of respect. The Charter says nothing (nor do the
rights theorists) about rights to a decent income, housing, health
care, or education; yet liberty and equality are not achieved when
some of our fellow citizens do not enjoy these things. Indeed, it is
important to be on guard against the perverse effect of the Charter
actually impeding the achievement of better social and economic
justice.9 That is not the topic of this article. My only points here
are that the Charter was made in Canada, not in heaven; that the
Charter's precepts reflect a set of values that have been selected by
imperfect human beings, not by God or reason or natural law; that
the Charter's precepts do not include all of the values upon which
Canadian society sets store, and not even all of the values necessary
for the achievement of individual liberty and equality; and, finally,
that extravagant claims for the Charters moral authority, or
deep-seated opposition to the use of section 1 or section 33, are
entirely inappropriate.
IL INTERPRETIVISM AND NONINTERPRETIVISM 10
A. Definitions
Only in America could such neologisms as "interpretivism"
and "noninterpretivism" have gained currency. Indeed these two
terms have become the banners under which two schools of
9 P.W. Hogg, "The Charter of Rights and Social and Economic Reform" in E.G. Baldwin,
ed., The Cambridge Lectures 1983 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985) at 45.
1OAn earlier version of this section of the article, entitled "Interpretivism and
Noninterpretivism," was delivered as a lecture on July 19, 1986 at the Stanford Lectures 1986,
a conference held at Stanford University by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies.
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constitutional theory contend. At issue is the proper role of the
courts in reviewing legislation that is attacked as contrary to the Bill
of Rights. In this section of the article I will argue that
noninterpretivism is nonsense; that interpretivism is a concept that
is useful only in contrast to noninterpretivism; and that both terms
can safely be banished from Canadian constitutional theory.
Nevertheless, the American controversy raises issues that are
relevant in Canada (or in any other country with a
judicially-enforced constitution). Some of these issues are addressed
in later sections of this article.
Interpretivism is the theory that holds that judicial review of
legislation must be based on the language of the constitution.
11
According to this theory, the role of the courts in reviewing
legislation should not go beyond the interpretation of the text.
Noninterpretivism is the theory that holds that the text is so vague
and indeterminate that the courts are inevitably driven to apply
standards that are not to be found in the text12 Once having
rejected the text as the source of the standards of judicial review,
the noninterpretists have to explain where the standards do come
from, and a variety of sources have been suggested: for example,
the moral values of the judge, the moral values of society, or some
variant of natural law, usually in the form of a theory of justice,
democracy, or morality
3
11See generally RtH. Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems"
(1971) 47 Ind. LJ. 1; R. Berger, Government by Judiciary (Mass.: Harvard University Press
1971). Compare H. Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" (1959) 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1.
1 2 See generally H.H. Wellington, "Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards" (1973) 83 Yale LJ. 221; R. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982); M.N. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1982).
13The various suggestions are catalogued and discussed in J.H. Ely, Democracy and
Distrust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) c. 3.
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B. Noninterpretivism Criticized
The noninterpretivist theory, even if it accurately reflects
what some judges have sometimes done, cannot provide a
satisfactory theoretical basis for judicial review. Judicial review in
the United States dates from the decision in Marbury v. Madison,
14
in which Marshall C.J. decided that a conflict between the
constitution and an ordinary statute had to be resolved in favour of
the constitution, because the constitution was the more fundamental
of the two competing laws. Judicial review in Canada stemmed from
similar reasoning. Where there was a conflict between the British
North America Actis and an ordinary statute, the British North
America Act had to prevail, because it was an imperial statute which
took precedence over the acts of colonial legislatures. 16 In each
country, therefore, judicial review was premised on a simple idea:
the duty of the courts was to apply the law, and, where two laws
were in conflict, the more fundamental constitutional law was
selected as the governing rule.
If it were the case that the courts were empowered to hold
statutes invalid by recourse to standards that are not in the
constitutional text, then we would expect to find the institution of
judicial review in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, two
countries in which the constitution has been held not to be a
fundamental law. Although the constitutions of the United Kingdom
and New Zealand are freely amendable by ordinary legislation, on
a noninterpretivist view a judge could be expected to hold a statute
invalid whenever it conflicted with the standards that justify judicial
review, whether they be the moral values of the judge, the moral
values of society, or natural law.
In England, a power of judicial review was indeed asserted
by Coke C.J. in 1610, in his famous statement that "when an Act of
Parliament is against the common right and reason, or repugnant, or
145 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
15British North America Act, 1867, U.K. 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.
16p.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: The Carswell Company
Limited, 1985) at 94-95.
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impossible to be performed, the common law [that is, the courts]
will control it, and adjudge such Act to be void." 7 But it seems
likely that Coke C.J.'s view was never more than an "empty
phrase."18  Certainly, the asserted power to hold an Act of
Parliament void was never actually exercised by an English court.
According to de Smith, at least by the time of the Revolution of
1688, "the judges had tacitly accepted a rule of obligation to give
effect to every Act of Parliament, no matter how preposterous its
content."1 9 The safeguards against preposterous legislation were
"political and conventional, not strictly legal."'2
In seventeenth-century England, Parliament became accepted
as superior to the other two branches of government, namely, the
King and the courts. All conflicts between Parliament and the other
branches were settled in Parliament's favour. This development was
an inevitable outcome of the growth of ideas of democracy. Even
the judges could see that Parliament's view of "common right and
reason" should be preferred to that of the courts. As the franchise
has extended and corrupt election practices have disappeared, it
seems even more obvious that the solemnly legislated decisions of an
elected Parliament should prevail over the policy preferences of
non-elected judges.
It is plain that noninterpretivism permits judges to impose
their views of sound policy or morality upon the accountable
branches of government, to the point of actually declaring legislation
to be void. Noninterpretivism grants to non-elected judges "a veto
over the politics of the nation,"21 forbidding its legislatures to reach
decisions that the judges believe are wrong. Such a veto is as
unacceptable, and for the same reasons, as a veto by the Queen or
1 7Dr. Bonhan's Case (1610), 8 Co. Rep. 113, 118; 77 E.R. 646, 652 (K.B.).
18 S.A. de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 4th ed. (London: Penguin
Education, 1981) at 80.
91bid. at 81.
20bid. at 82.
21 Dworkin, "The Forum of Principle" (1981) 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 469 at 469.
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the Governor-General - a veto that existed in colonial times but has
now been discarded as incompatible with democracy.
C. Interpretivism Criticized
If noninterpretivism is such a bad idea, why does it enjoy so
much support among constitutional lawyers in the United States?
The answer seems to lie in the general acceptance of theories of
interpretation that are much narrower than those accepted by
Canadian lawyers. Thus, Raoul Berger, the leading modern
exponent of interpretivism, claims that the Constitution of the
United States is frozen in the sense intended at the time of its
adoption. That sense may be derived from the plain words of the
text, or, where the text is ambiguous, from evidence of the intention
of the framers. In his book, Government by Judiciary,22 Berger
examines the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment.23
Having satisfied himself that the majority of the framers did not
intend to end the racial segregation of schools or the
malapportionment of state legislatures, he concludes that Brown v.
Board of Education24 (which held that racial segregation of public
schools violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment) and Baker v. Can25 (which held that the equal
22Berger, supra, note 11.
23 Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law-, nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws....
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
24347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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protection clause required that each vote be of equal value) were
wrongly decided.2 6
Interpretivism, as expounded by Berger, is a difficult pill to
swallow. To modern eyes, the Fourteenth Amendment, which
guarantees "equal protection of the laws," seems rather clearly apt
to condemn racial segregation in schools and other public facilities.
The amendment will also bear the meaning of condemning the gross
underrepresentation of urban dwellers in state legislatures. Further,
as Berger agrees, such distinctions plainly ought to be condemned.
It seems a hard rule to have to say that the elimination of racial
segregation cannot be administered by the courts because the group
of men who framed the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War
- more than 100 years ago - did not contemplate its use for that
purpose. This is certainly not a rule to fire the imagination. It is
little wonder that (as Berger concedes) American courts have
preferred the rule of "progressive interpretation," under which a
constitutional text is not frozen in the sense in which it would have
been understood at the time of its framing, but is open to new
interpretations in response to changing conditions and ideas.
The case for interpretivism (or "originalism" as it is
sometimes described) as expounded by Berger, is related to the
legitimacy of judicial review. He argues that it is inappropriate in
a democracy for non-elected judges to substitute their policy
preferences for those of the elected legislators. If the interpretation
of the constitution could not go beyond the "original understanding,"
the judges' policy preferences would be excluded from constitutional
adjudication. If constitutional adjudication were based solely on the
values of the framers, then judicial review would be a legitimate
enterprise. Once extrinsic values are introduced into constitutional
adjudication by non-elected judges, the problem of legitimacy cannot
be resolved. Noninterpretivism is illegitimate, Berger argues,
because it grants to the Supreme Court a power to amend the
constitution without recourse to the amending procedure provided
for in the constitution. Interpretivism confines the Court to its
proper role and is therefore essential to the legitimacy of judicial
review.
26Berger, supra, note 11 at 348-50.
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The trouble with interpretivism,27 is that the concept of the
"original understanding" or "framers' intention" is far too vague and
elusive to control the process of interpretation. Consider the
difficulties. It is difficult to identify the framers - the persons whose
intentions count - out of the numerous individuals in the various
legislative bodies that adopted the Fourteenth Amendment (or any
other constitutional text). It is difficult in any event to attribute a
single intention to a deliberative body, or several deliberative bodies,
if they did not pass a resolution on the point in issue. It is difficult
to ascertain historical facts: even historians dispute basic questions
about the making of the American constitution, and apparently
settled ideas are capable of being overturned by the discovery of
new material or the reinterpretation of existing sources.
Even if all these difficulties could be overcome (which I
deny), the original understanding is still a fundamentally ambiguous
idea. The originalist's assumption is that the framers had clear views
about the meaning of the words they were adopting and intended
that these meanings should be forever conclusive. However, it is at
least equally plausible to attribute a quite different "interpretive
intent" to the framers. They undoubtedly intended their handiwork
to last for a long time. They knew that there would be great
changes in society in the succeeding decades and centuries. They
knew that amendment would be difficult. It is at least possible,
therefore, that the framers did not desire that their text be frozen
in the sense that it bore at its origin; that they were content to
leave the detailed application of the constitution to the courts of the
future; and that they were content that the process of adjudication
would apply the text in ways that could not be anticipated at the
time of the drafting.28 In other words, the principle of "progressive
interpretation" is not necessarily antagonistic to the "original
understanding" or the intention of the framers.
2 7For a more detailed discussion see P.W. Hogg, "Legislative History in Constitutional
Cases" in Sharpe ed., Clarter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) c. 6. See also Dworkin,
supra, note 21, and D. Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding" (1980)
60 Bos. U.L. Rev. 204.
2 8 For discussion, see Hogg, supra, note 16 at 340-41.
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D. Legislative History in Canada
There has always been a difference between the United
States and Canada in the judicial attitude towards the legislative
history (the drafting process) of constitutional and statutory texts.
In the United States, legislative history is routinely admissible as an
aid to interpretation. This is undoubtedly one of the reasons why
Berger can argue that the original intention of the framers is "as
good as written into the text"29 and is "binding" on the court.3
Such an argument would be utterly implausible in Canada and other
Commonwealth jurisdictions where legislative history has generally
been held to be inadmissible as an aid to the construction of
constitutional or statutory texts. In the last ten years the Supreme
Court of Canada has become more receptive to the use of legislative
history but has never really deviated from its longstanding attitude
that it is the language of the text that is authoritative, not the
unexpressed intention of its framers31 Legislative history, although
now admissible, is to be used with great caution and given little
weight.32
E. Progressive Inteipretation in Canada
The principle of progressive interpretation of the constitution
is as firmly established in Canada as is the principle of minimal
reliance on legislative history. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
asserted that the language of the constitution is not to be frozen in
the sense in which it would have been understood in 1867. Rather,
2 9 Berger, supra, note 11 at 368.
301bid. at 3.
31 Hogg, supra, note 16 at c. 6.
32Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act (1985), [1985] 2 S.C.Rt 486 at 504-09, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536
at 551-55.
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the constitution is to be regarded as "a living tree capable of growth
and expansion within its natural limits.
'33
In Canada, progressive interpretation has been an essential
tool in allocating legislative jurisdiction over technological
developments that did not exist in 1867 and could not have been
provided for by the framers. For example, no one expected the
courts to wait for a constitutional amendment before allocating
legislative authority over the telephone,3 4 radio,35 television,36 or
aviation3 7  Much modern regulation of labour relations, the
professions, marketing, and business generally, pursues purposes and
employs means that could not have been anticipated in 1867;38 nor
could the rise of the welfare state, with its elaborate systems for the
public provision of education, health, and welfare have been
anticipated.3 9 Yet all these developments have been litigated
through the courts, and decisions have been given as to the
legislative body with responsibility for each new measure.40 In every
3 3Edwards v. A.-G. Can. (1929), [1930] A.C. 124 at 136, [1930] 1 D.LR 98.
34Toronto v. Bell Telephone Co. (1904), [1905] A.C. 52.
3 5Re Regulation and Control of Radio Connunications in Canada (1932), [1932] A.C. 304,
[1932] D.L.R. 81.
3 6 Capital Cities Communications v. C.R.T.C. (1978), [19781 2 S.C.R. 141, 81 D.L.R. (3d)
609.
3 7johannesson v. West St. Paul (1951), [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 609.
3 8 For example, Toronto Electric Commrs. v. Snider (1925), 11925] A.C. 396, [1925] 2
D.L.R. 5 (labour relations); Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Bd. (1938), [1938] A.C.
708, [1938] 4 D.LR. 81 (marketing); Can. Indemnity Co. v. A.-G. B.C. (1976), [1977] 2 S.C.IR
504, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 111 (insurance).
39Eng. A.-G. Can. v. A.G. Ont. (1937), [1937] A.C. 355, [19371 1 D.L.R. 684
(unemployment insurance).
40With rare exceptions (aviation, supra, note 37, above, is one), the courts did not
allocate these new matters to the federal residuary power (peace, order and good government)
or the provincial residuary power (local and private matters). They allocated the new matters
to particular enumerated heads of power, interpreting the language of the head of power as apt
to encompass the new matter.
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case the court has assumed that the language of the constitutional
text is capable of application to laws that could not possibly have
been within the contemplation of anyone in 1867.
The principle of progressive interpretation has also been
applied to the minority language guarantee in section 133 of the
Constitution Act, 1867.41 This section is one of the few bill-of-rights
provisions in Canada's pre-1982 constitution. In A.-G. Que. v.
Blaikie,42 the Supreme Court of Canada held that section 133's
requirement that "Acts" of the Quebec Legislature be in both
English and French applied to delegated legislation as well,
reasoning that account should be taken of "the growth of delegated
legislation. 43 In the same case, the Court held that section 133's
requirement that both languages could be used in "the Courts of
Quebec" extended to administrative tribunals, reasoning that "it
would be overly technical to ignore the modern development of
noncurial adjudicative agencies which play so important a role in our
society."
44
Since the Charter of Rights dates only from 1982, the
Supreme Court of Canada has not yet been called upon to apply its
provisions to facts that could not have been within the
contemplation of the framers. But the Court has clearly stated that
the principle of progressive interpretation applies to the Charter no
less than to the rest of the constitution.
45
41 U.I 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.
42[1979] 2 S.C.tR 1016, 101 D.L.IR (3d) 394.
4 3 Ibid. at 1027. The Court later exempted local by-laws and some other kinds of
delegated legislation: A.-G. Que. v. Blaikie (No. 2) (1981), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 312, 123 D.L.R, (3d)
15.
441bid. at 1029.
45 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker (1984), [1984] 1 S.C.RI 357 at 365-66, 9
D.L.IR (4th) 161 at 167-68; Hunter v. Southam (1984), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155-57, 11 D.L.IR
(4th) 641 at 649-51. See the short discussion in Re B.C. Motor VehicleAct, supra, note 32 at 509.
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F. Scope of Inteipretation
Although Canadian (and American) courts have accepted the
principle of progressive interpretation, it is still necessary to
investigate the question whether judicial review that depends upon
the progressive interpretation of a constitutional text can be justified
in a democratic society. In the United States, constitutional
commentators have tended to accept Berger's conception of
interpretation as rooted in the "original understanding" of the
framers. Once that narrow conception of interpretation is accepted,
it is necessary to explain, and natural to want to justify, the
constitutional decisions of American courts by reference to standards
of justice or morality that are independent of the constitutional text.
The noninterpretivist explanation of judicial review, which
invokes standards of justice or morality that are independent of the
constitutional text, does not answer Berger's objections to the
legitimacy of judicial review. On the contrary, it confirms them.
Since there is no agreement on the content of these extrinsic
standards, or on the source of their authority, it is plainly illegitimate
for a non-elected court to use such standards to strike down
legislation. Moreover, the appeal to standards extrinsic to the
constitution fails to explain why there is no judicial review at all in
the United Kingdom and New Zealand, and very little bill-of-rights
review in Australia and (before 1982) in Canada, despite the shared
common-law tradition and acceptance of similar civil libertarian
values. The noninterpretivist position seems deficient both in theory
and in practice. In theory, judicial review must be derived from a
constitutional text in order to be legitimate. In practice, judicial
review does not exist in those countries that lack a constitutional
text like the American Bill of Rights.
If the interpretivist explanation of judicial review is defective
for its failure to explain the decisions and for its reliance on the
nonjusticiable conception of an "original understanding," and if the
noninterpretivist explanation is defective for its failure to legitimate
the decisions and for its reliance on nonjusticiable standards of
justice or morality, what is the correct explanation? The answer, it
seems to me, is to deny that the interpretation of a constitutional
text is limited in the way that Berger insists. That narrow
[VOL. 25 NO. 1
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conception of interpretation is the premise from which both
contending theories proceed. The common ground is that, once a
Court departs from the original understanding (whatever that is), it
is no longer engaged in interpretation, but is doing something else.
The interpretivist concludes that the "something else" is not part of
the judicial function and is accordingly an illegitimate political
function. The noninterpretivist looks for standards outside the
constitutional text that could explain the decisions in terms that still
enable the judicial function to be distinguished from the political
function.
It seems to me that judicial review must be derived from the
constitution and from no other source. A Court is justified in
holding a law to be void only if the law is inconsistent with the
constitution. Any other justification cannot answer the objection
that non-elected officials should not be able to veto the actions of
elected officials. But judicial review can be derived from the
constitution while departing from or ignoring the original
understanding. The doctrine of progressive interpretation is no less
faithful to the constitutional text than interpretivism. Like
interpretivism, it is based on the words of the constitution, read in
the context of the document as a whole. It differs from
interpretivism only in that the doctrine of progressive interpretation
assumes that the words of the constitution need not be frozen in the
sense in which they were understood by the framers, but are to be
read in a sense that is appropriate to current conditions. If general
language is apt to apply to a set of modern-day facts, then the
doctrine stipulates that the language should be so applied, regardless
of whether the framers contemplated its application to those facts.
Indeed, if the framers had the interpretive intent that would
permit progressive interpretation of the text, the doctrine of
progressive interpretation is arguably more faithful to the intent of
the drafters than is interpretivism. Interpretivism requires that an
artificially narrow interpretation be placed upon the words of the
constitution in deference to historical evidence of the unexpressed
original understanding. In view of the many difficulties associated
with the ascertainment of the original understanding, it is surely
preferable to move the emphasis of the interpretive inquiry away
from the unexpressed views of the framers and back to the actual
words that the framers put into the text. Under the doctrine of
1987]
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progressive interpretation the words of the text are given a meaning
that seems natural to contemporary eyes, not a meaning that has
been distilled from historical records extrinsic to the actual text.
Once the narrow perspective of interpretivism has been
rejected, it is plain that much of what is offered as noninterpretivism
is really nothing more than the interpretation of the constitutional
text. The clearest case is that of Ely, who has a process-based
theory of judicial review46 that is discussed later in this article. Ely
seems to regard himself as a noninterpretivist,47 but when you
examine how his theory is derived, you find that he relies upon the
structure of government established by the constitution as applying
a process-based context which, he argues, should colour those parts
of the Bill of Rights that are not unambiguously process-based. It
seems clear that Ely is engaged in interpretation. He is not
advocating that the judges apply values drawn from some source
outside the constitution: he finds the governing values in the
structure of the constitution itself. A similar point can undoubtedly
be made about some other noninterpretivist theory. As Dworkin
has pointed out, "any recognizable theory of judicial review is
interpretive in the sense that it aims to provide an interpretation of
the Constitution as an original, foundational legal document, and
also aims to integrate the Constitution into our constitutional and
legal practice as a whole."
48
III. PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION
Thus far, I have argued that judicial review of legislation
must be based exclusively on the words of the constitution, and that
the words of the constitution should receive a progressive
interpretation. There is no doubt that both these principles
46Ely, supra, note 13.
4 7Ibid. at 41. Ely criticizes the interpretivist position and the non-interpretivist position,
but says that "the dominant mode [of noninterpretivism] can be improved upon, or at least that
is the burden of the rest of this book."
48Dworkin, supra, note 21 at 472. Accord, PJ. Monahan, "Mistaking Moral Growth: The
Constitutional Mythology of Michael Perry" (1984) 9 Queen's LJ. 293 at 299-303.
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constitute orthodox Canadian constitutional law. A third
proposition, equally orthodox, is that the words of the constitution
should receive a "purposive" interpretation.
This last proposition is so trite that it may seem hardly worth
stating. After all, a similar principle applies to the interpretation of
statutes, contracts, wills, or, indeed, any form of written (or oral)
communication. Although trite, the principle is important. There
is a natural tendency for a reader to focus on individual words or
phrases to extract the desired meaning, forgetting that those words
or phrases take their colour from their context. In Law Society of
Upper Canada v. Skapinker,49 for example, it was argued that section
6(2)(b) of the Charter, which guarantees the right "to pursue the
gaining of a livelihood in any province," conferred a right to work
that was inconsistent with the requirement of citizenship for
admission to the legal profession in Ontario. Read literally, in
isolation from the rest of the section, the language of section
6(2)(b) could certainly bear this meaning. However, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the purpose of section 6, as evidenced by
its heading (Mobility Rights) as well as its general purport, was to
protect mobility between provinces. Qualified in this way, section
6(2)(b) was not a bar to a citizenship requirement for entry to a
profession or trade.
A purposive approach is also useful in elaborating those
words in the Charter that are especially vague or ambiguous. In
Hunter v. Southam,50 the question was what constitutes an
"unreasonable" search under section 8 of the Charter. The Supreme
Court of Canada held that the purpose of section 8 was "to protect
individuals from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy," and
this purpose could be adequately fulfilled only by "preventing
unjustified searches before they happen, not simply of determining,
after the fact, whether they ought to have occurred in the first
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only if authorized by a statute which required a prior warrant issued
by an impartial tribunal on a sworn showing of probable cause. All
this was drawn from the single word "unreasonable" in section 8,
but, in light of the purpose of the section, the ruling does not seem
to go beyond the realm of interpretation.
The undoubted usefulness of a purposive interpretation
invites the question whether the Charter has a single over-arching
purpose which would illuminate each provision. In the United
States, Ely has argued that the purpose of reinforcing the
democratic political process can be derived from the particular
provisions of the Bill of Rights and by inference from the nature of
the constitution as a whole 2 In principle, his argument could easily
be adapted to fit Canada's Charter, and Fairley and Monahan have
both taken that step.5 3 This process-based view of the Bill of Rights
and the Charter is not in my view a satisfactory general theory.5 4 It
is the topic of the next section of the article.
IV. PROCESS-BASED INTERPRETATION
A. Ely's Thesis
Ely's argument is that the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to
protect the process of decision-making. The Bill of Rights, he
argues, leaves the selection of substantive values to the political
process; the Bill of Rights "is overwhelmingly concerned, on the one
hand, with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes
52Ely, supra, note 13.
53 H.S. Fairley, "Enforcing the Charter Some Thoughts on an Appropriate and Just
Standard for Judicial Review" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R. 217; PJ. Monahan, "Judicial Review
and Democracy: A Theory of Judicial Review" (1986) 21 U.B.C.L. Rev. 87.
54Fairley, ibid. at 233, makes a more modest claim for his theory, claiming that it has no
application to the more specific provisions of the Charter, where the text alone yields a clear
answer. But the vague provisions are so distributed through the Charter that he needs to be
able to sustain a general theory. Monahan, ibid. at 158, acknowledges that there are other
purposes embodied in the Charter as well, and that the language rights are "the major
exception" to his analysis.
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(process writ small), and, on the other, with what might capaciously
be designated process writ large - with ensuring broad participation
in the processes and distributions of government."55  Fairley and
Monahan have made a similar argument with respect to the Charter
of Rights. In Monahan's words, the Charter does not require the
courts "to test the substantive outcomes of the political process
against some theory of the right or the good;" rather, the Charter
guarantees the integrity of the political process itself by enhancing
"the opportunities for public debate and collective deliberation."
5 6
This process-based theory of judicial review offers two
important advantages. The first advantage is that it supplies a
helpful context for interpreting particular guarantees. The
guarantees of free speech or expression, for example, should be seen
not as constitutive of personal autonomy (a substantive value), but
as an instrument of democratic government (a process-based value).
The guarantees of due process or fundamental justice should be
seen not as requiring substantively just (or good) outcomes, but as
requiring a fair procedure.
The second advantage of the process-based theory of judicial
review is that it offers a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of
judicial review. Under this theory, the judges need never take
positions on controversial substantive issues, because the constitution
does not address such issues. All that the judges are concerned with
is the fairness of the process by which legislative bodies or other
agencies or officials reach their decisions. It is not the wisdom,
justice, or rightness of the outcomes of the political process, but the
integrity of the process itself, that is the proper subject of judicial
review. When a bench of non-elected judges strikes down a statute
enacted by an elected legislative body, it is doing so either because
the process of enacting the statute was flawed or because the statute
itself places impediments in the way of a fair political process. Such
decisions .may be controversial, but they involve judgments only on
matters of process or procedure; they do not trespass on the
exclusive power of elected officials to determine the substantive
5 5Ey, supra, note 13 at 87.
56Monahan, supra, note 53 at 89. Compare Fairley, supra, note 53 at 234.
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values by which society is to be governed. Viewed in this light, the
power of judicial review is not incompatible with democracy; indeed,
process-based judicial review casts the judges in the role of "servants
of democracy even as they strike down the actions of supposedly
democratic governments."
57
At first glance, the process-based theory is attractive. Even
if the crucial distinction between process and substance is hard to
draw, this theory provides a means of limiting the scope of some of
the broader Charter guarantees and thereby reduces the political
element of judicial decision-making. I have no doubt that judicial
review is best addressed to process rather than substance, but I do
not think that process provides a satisfactory general or
comprehensive theory of judicial review, either under the American
Bill of Rights or under the Charter of Rights. With respect to the
American Bill of Rights, Tribe58 and Dworkin"9 have effectively
criticized Ely's thesis. With respect to the Charter of Rights,
Fairley60 and Monahan, 61 writing with the benefit of Ely's critiques,
adopt modified versions of Ely's thesis. They also fail to resolve the
difficulties with the thesis. With great reluctance, I have rejected
the process-based theory of judicial review for the reasons that
follow.
B. Expressly Substantive Rights
The first difficulty with a process-based theory of judicial
review is that some of the constitutional guarantees are expressly
substantive. Tribe has made this point with respect to the American
5 7L.H. Tribe, "The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories" (1980)
89 Yale L.J. 1063 at 1063.
58 bd
59Dworkin, supra, note 21.
60Fairley, supra, note 53 at 234-38.
6 1Monahan, supra, note 53 at 88-94.
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Bill of Rights, pointing to the guarantee of religious liberty, the
prohibition of religious establishment, the abolition of slavery, the
just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment, and other
property-protecting measures. 62 A similar point may be made about
the Canadian Charter, although the list would be different. Freedom
of conscience and religion (section 2(a)) seems to be a substantive
restraint on the activities of legislative bodies, as evidenced by the
recent invalidation of Sunday closing legislation. 63 Even freedom of
expression (section 2(b)) is not easy to fit into the process-based
mould. Although the guarantee will obviously protect political
speech, the choice of the word "expression" in preference to the
narrower word "speech" (which is used in the First Amendment)
strongly suggests a much broader function for the guarantee,
extending to forms of expression such as art, music, or dance that
have little or no impact on the political process. 64 The mobility
rights of section 6 protect an individual's freedom of movement,
mainly in the service of personal autonomy, partly in the service of
economic efficiency, but surely only minimally in the service of an
improved political process. The guarantee of "life, liberty and
security of the person" in section 7 might fit the process argument
if "fundamental justice" were construed as a procedural guarantee
only,65 but the Supreme Court of Canada has decided that it is
substantive.6 None of these provisions can be wholly explained by
a process-based theory.
62Tribe, supra, note 57 at 1065.
63R v. Big M Dng Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R 295, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321.
64Hogg, supra, note 16 at 714.
6 5 But see my discussion of the legal rights guarantees in the next section of this article.
66
Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 32.
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C. Legal Rights
Secondly, the legal rights guarantees, which assure fairness in
the investigation, apprehension, trial, and punishment of persons
accused of crime, fit the process argument in only a superficial way.
Ely describes each guarantee as "process writ small."67 Of course,
the legal rights are predominantly (but not entirely)68 procedural,
but they are quite unlike the political rights to speak, assemble,
associate, and vote. A main purpose of the political rights is
undoubtedly to protect the integrity of the political process, as Ely,
Fairley, and Monahan maintain. But the purpose of according due
process to those accused of crimes has nothing to do with the
political process, and everything to do with respect for individual
liberty, dignity, and privacy. The reason why a legislative body
cannot impose more expeditious and efficient methods of law
enforcement is because the constitution insists that the liberty,
dignity, and privacy of those accused of crime must be given priority
over the exigencies of law enforcement. I agree with Tribe, who
concludes that "a right to individual dignity, or some similarly
substantive norm, [is] the base upon which conceptions of
procedural fairness are constructed."69  In other words, the legal
rights, although procedural in form, are substantive in purpose.
They cannot be justified by an exclusively process-based theory.
D. Equal Protection
Thirdly, the right to equal protection or equality does not
easily fit the process argument. The argument that it does fit is
6 7See quotation accompanying note 55. Fairley, supra, note 53, does not explain how the
legal rights fit into the thesis. Monahan, supra, note 53 at 158, characterizes the legal rights as
"an attempt to moderate and equalize the power relationship between state and individual."
It is certainly true that persons accused of crimes are powerless. The question is whether the
legal rights are conferred on accused persons because they are powerless or because of respect
for their individual dignity. Probably, the answer is: for both reasons; but, if so, I suggest that
the latter is the more fundamental.
68Re B.C Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 32.
69Tribe, supra, note 57 at 1070.
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usually derived from the famous Carolene Products7 footnote, in
which Stone J. of the Supreme Court of the United States pointed
out that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities. 71 The point is that discrimination against groups such as
blacks may reflect a flawed political process from which blacks are
effectively excluded. Judicial review of discriminatory laws can be
justified as the correction of a failure of the political process - the
failure to represent adequately a "discrete and insular minority."
This is the position taken by Ely,72 Fairley,73 and Monahan. 74
Viewed from this perspective, judicial review of discriminatory laws
reflects a concern with unequal access to the political process rather
than a concern with the substantive value of equality.
The process-based rationale of equal protection undoubtedly
contains an important insight into why discrimination on the basis of
race (for example) is objectionable. As a general theory of equality,
however, it is surely contrived. A legislative classification is
generally thought to be bad when it is inappropriate to the
legislative purpose that it purports to serve.75 For most legitimate
legislative purposes, a person's race (for example) is irrelevant;
therefore, such a classification is usually unconstitutional. No one
has ever attempted to ask the further question, namely, whether the
disadvantaged race enjoyed insufficient access to the political
process. That is an empirical question that is probably
70 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
71.bid. at 153, note 4.
72Ely, supra, note 13 at c. 6.
73Fairley, supra, note 53 at 243, 249-50.
7 4 Monahan, supra, note 53 at 89-97.
75The seminal article on equality is J. Tussman & J. TenBroek, "The Equal Protection
of the Laws" (1949) 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341.
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unanswerable, at least in the context of a lawsuit.76 The question is
not answered simply by pointing to the discriminatory law,77 since
the disadvantaged group could have been well represented in the
political process and simply failed to persuade the government of the
rightness of its case.78 In a democracy it must be expected that a
majority will often overrule a minority; rule by the majority is after
all the governing principle of democratic politics. Not every group
that loses a political battle is on that account a "discrete and insular
minority."
79
It seems to me that equality review both begins and ends
with a judicial judgment about the appropriateness of the legislative
classification. Where the classification seems to have no rational
basis it will be held to be unjust discrimination, regardless of the
access to the political process that is possessed by the disadvantaged
group. The value that the equality clause protects is not the
integrity of the political process, but the value of equality: the
equal worth of each individual dictates that no-one should be denied
opportunities by reason of irrational prejudice towards their race,
76Fairley, supra, note 53 at 249-50, regards this issue as justiciable, because he argues that
a law regarding abortion could be attacked if it could be "demonstrated" that "women were
systematically prejudiced as a result of either male-dominated legislative representation and
repressive societal stereotypes or undue legislative deference to pro-life pressure groups" [my
emphasis).
77Fairley, ibid. at 243, says that the enactment of repressive laws (against Jehovah's
Witnesses in Quebec) "proves" that the disadvantaged group is a "discrete and insular minority."
78Suppose, for example, that the federal Parliament banned the sale of alcohol to persons
over 65 on the ground of a higher incidence of alcoholism among older people. Suppose
further that it could be established that the government and Parliament listened attentively to
effective and persistent submissions of the views of older people, but decided in the end not
to accept their submissions. Would the latter fact save a law that so plainly uses an
inappropriate classification to combat alcohol abuse? Surely the answer must be no.
"For criticism of the phrase "discrete and insular minority," on the basis that discrete
and insular minorities are relatively effective in the American political process, in comparison
with anonymous and diffuse minorities (or majorities), see B.A. Ackerman, "Beyond Carolene
Products" (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 at 713.
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sex, status, or any other characteristic. Equality is thus a substantive
value protecting the liberty of the individual.80
E. Conclusion Regarding Process-based Interpretation
The view of the Charter of Rights as ultimately supportive of
the democratic political process is not accurate. There is no single
principle that explains judicial review and reconciles it with
democracy. The process-based theory of judicial review does not fit
the guarantees that are expressly substantive; the theory does not fit
the guarantees of legal rights which, although procedural in form,
protect the substantive value of the dignity of the individual; and the
theory does not fit the guarantee of equality, which is also a
substantive value. The more accurate view is that all of the Charter
guarantees respect some aspect of individual liberty, dignity, or
privacy, and only a few of the guarantees are truly supportive of the
democratic political process. There is no escaping the fact that
judicial review enables the judges to strike down those products of
the democratic political process that fail to respect those aspects of
individual autonomy that are guaranteed by the Charter.
For those who believe that the outcomes of the political
process should always prevail over the views of non-elected judges,
judicial review is always objectionable. But the extent of the
interference with the accountable branches of government is
mitigated by three considerations. First, judicial review can occur
only when a law (or official act) is inconsistent with a Charter right.
The judges do not have carte blanche to strike down laws that are
unpalatable to them: they are constrained by the language of the
Charter. Secondly, even if a law (or official act) is held to violate
a guaranteed right, the law will still survive by virtue of section 1
of the Charter if the government can establish that the law is a
80See Tribe, supra, note 57 at 1077-79; Dworkin, supra, note 21 at 500-10. Tribe and
Dworkin even take issue with Ely's process-based rationale for those rights that are integral to
the political process: speech, assembly and voting. They point out that the characterization
of even these rights as process-based depends upon controversial assumptions about the nature
of democracy, and about the value of equal participation of individuals in the democratic
process. Fairley, supra, note 53 at 238 and Monahan, supra, note 53 at 75 acknowledge the
validity of this point, but they both take the view that the essence of a process-based theory can
survive the acknowledgement.
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reasonable limit on the right and that the law can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society. Thirdly, after a law has
been held to be invalid as contrary to the Charter, if the violated
right was a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15,
Parliament or a Legislature can re-enact the law with the addition
of a notwithstanding clause: under section 33, such a law is
effective to override the terms of the Charter.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has advanced the following propositions:
1. There are no "natural rights," or at least none that a
court may take notice of. The only rights that are legally effective
are those recognized by positive law. The only rights that prevail
over inconsistent legislation are those that are contained in the
Charter of Rights (or elsewhere in the constitution).
2. The only legitimate justification for a judicial decision that
a law is invalid (judicial review of legislation) is that the law is
inconsistent with the constitution. Faced with an inconsistency of
this kind, a court may, indeed must, hold that the more fundamental
constitutional provision prevails.
3. It is not a legitimate justification for judicial review that
a law is abhorrent to the judges, or is contrary to community
morality or justice or natural law or any other standard that is
extrinsic to the constitution. Because there is no agreement on the
content of such extrinsic standards, and no agreement on the source
of their authority, they are not satisfactory bases for judicial decision.
Since judges are not elected or otherwise politically accountable, it
is wrong in a democracy that they should possess a power to annul
the acts of elective legislative bodies, except where there is an
inconsistency with the constitution. The American "noninterpretivist"
theories of judicial review, which deny these propositions, should be
rejected in Canada.
4. Because the constitution is expressed in general terms,
there is often a question as to whether or not a particular law is
inconsistent with the constitution. When that question is properly
before a court, the question must be resolved by interpreting the
constitution. The court is not, however, obliged to interpret the
constitution in accordance with the "original understanding" of the
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framers as to its meaning. The court must give the constitution a
"fprogressive" interpretation so that it applies to contemporary
conditions that could not have been foreseen by the framers. The
American "interpretivist" theory of judicial review, which insists on
the primacy of the original understanding, should be rejected in
Canada.
5. While judicial review is only legitimate if it is based on
the text of the constitution, this does not entail a narrow
clause-bound approach to the text. On the contrary, use should be
made of everything that helps to shed light on the text. This will
include the legislative history of the text (to be treated with great
caution), the judicial precedents interpreting the text, the purpose of
the text, its relationship to other parts of the constitution, and
implications drawn from the governmental institutions and structures
established by the constitution. Reasoning based on these kinds of
premises is sufficiently constrained by the terms of the constitution
to qualify as interpretation.
6. The constitution should receive a purposive
interpretation, meaning that its provisions should be interpreted in
such a way as to give effect to their purposes. However, there is no
single purpose that underlies all of the provisions of the Charter of
Rights. They pursue a range of purposes. The American theory
that judicial review can be confined to the single purpose of
facilitating the democratic political process must be rejected in
Canada, because it is not compatible with the terms of the Charter
of Rights.
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